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This paper explores the consequences of the expiration of charity care requirements imposed on private
hospitals by the Hill-Burton Act.  We examine delivery care and the health of newborns using the
universe of Florida births from 1989-2003 combined with hospital data from the American Hospital
Association.  We find that charity care requirements were binding on hospitals, but that private hospitals
under obligation “cream skimmed” the least risky maternity patients.  Conditional on patient characteristics,
they provided less intensive maternity services but without compromising patient health.  When obligations
expired, private hospitals quickly reduced their charity caseloads, shifting maternity patients to public
hospitals.  There they received more intensive services, but did not experience improvements in health.
These results suggest that public hospitals provided services less efficiently than private hospitals
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I. Introduction 
The provision of charity care, medical care for those who lack insurance and cannot 
afford to pay for it, is a central issue in the current debate over health care reform in the U.S..  
This is not surprising given that the number of U.S. residents without health insurance is 
projected to increase to 52 million or 19% of the population this year (Gilmer and Kronick, 
2009).  At the same time, the proportion of U.S. physicians providing charity care dropped 8 
percentage points in the last decade, falling to 68 percent of physicians in 2004-05.  Among 
physicians who practice in a hospital setting, the drop is even larger – from 66% in 1996-1997 to 
54 percent in 2004-2005 (Cunningham and May, 2006).   
Historically, different solutions to the charity care problem have been implemented for 
specific groups.  For example, the elderly all receive public health insurance under the Medicare 
program.   Most children are now eligible for insurance coverage under a mix of private and 
public insurance plans, where the coverage of the public insurance plan (Medicaid) is sometimes 
substantially better or worse than that of most private plans.   And many indigent patients receive 
charity care, often at public hospitals.   Private non-profit hospitals receive substantial tax 
subsidies in return for an implicit agreement that the hospitals provide public services including 
the provision of charity care.   
One proposal that has been discussed in the context of health care reform is to place 
explicit requirements to provide charity care on these hospitals.  Pear (2009) describes a 
bipartisan proposal sponsored by Senators Baucus and Grassley to require an explicit amount of 
charity care in return for getting or keeping tax exempt status.  This provision has been 
vigorously  opposed by organizations representing hospitals on the grounds that the current   3 
system of tax subsidies already successfully encourages hospitals to provide charity care so that 
quotas would increase the burden on hospital administrators without creating any social benefit.  
This paper studies the effects of an earlier program that required private hospitals to 
provide a fixed percentage of charity care to “pay back” construction subsidies.  The Hospital 
Survey and Construction Act of 1946 was intended to improve hospital infrastructure in 
underserved areas.  It is often referred to as the Hill-Burton Act after its two senate sponsors.  
The Act provided grants and low-interest loans for hospital construction, and specified that 
recipients would be obligated to provide charity care for 20 years after the initial funds had been 
disbursed (see Almond et al., 2007 and Almond, Chay, and Greenstone, 2007 for further 
discussion).   An important point is that over our sample period, Hill-Burton requirements took 
the form of explicit quotas on the amount of charity care to be provided. 
  We examine hospitals’ responses to the expiration of these requirements using a unique 
data set of all births in hospitals in Florida between 1989 and 2003.  An important feature of 
these data is that we can track the same mothers over time, and hence we can control for the 
selection of mothers into different types of hospitals by estimating models with mother fixed 
effects.  We investigate the effects of contract expirations on the services offered by the 
facilities, the mix of mothers served, procedures, and health outcomes.  Furthermore, Florida is a 
state with an especially large number of uninsured persons. In 2006, 25.3% of the non-elderly 
population did not have health insurance coverage compared to 18.1% nationally.
1
We find that private hospitals under obligation were indeed constrained by the charity 
care provisions.  However, they selected low risk patients and offered less aggressive (and 
therefore less expensive) maternity services. When their obligations expired, private hospitals 
quickly adjusted the mix of services and their caseloads and reduced the amount of charity care 
   
                                                 
1 Authors’ calculations based on the Current Population Survey   4 
provided. Hence, the tax subsidy for non-profit hospitals, which remained in place, was not 
enough to encourage hospitals to maintain previous levels of charity care.    
Private hospitals whose obligations expired reduced the provision of maternity care, and 
shifted mothers to public hospitals.  Perhaps surprisingly, mothers in public hospitals received 
additional services, but did not benefit from any measureable improvements in outcomes.  Thus, 
the public hospitals provided maternity services to the marginal patient less efficiently than 
private hospitals that were constrained to serve charity patients.  These results provide additional 
support for solutions to the charity care problem that integrate the uninsured into the mainstream 
of health care delivery.    
If health care reform is successful, the numbers of people without insurance, and thus the 
need for outright charity care, will be reduced.  However, the need will not be eliminated since, 
for example, undocumented immigrants will not be covered by any current proposals.  Moreover, 
differences in the generosity of health insurance coverage are likely to remain.  Our results 
indicate that it may be socially advantageous to provide public incentives or mandates for private 
providers to treat those who are underinsured, rather than expanding public provision of care.   
However it is likely key to our results that, as we discuss below, private hospitals had strong 
incentives to keep the costs of charity care down, and these incentives may have spilled over 
onto their treatment of other patients.  Another reading of our results is that private hospitals are 
quick to adjust practices and caseloads in response to financial incentives, so that appropriate 
incentives are essential to control health care costs. 
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.  The next section provides important 
background information and a discussion of hospital incentives.  Section III describes the data   5 
and Section IV describes our methods.  Results are shown in Section V, with some extensions in 
Section VI.  Section VII concludes.  
 
II. Background on the Hill-Burton Program and Hospital Incentives 
  The Hill-Burton Act authorized Federal grants, loans, and loan guarantees to assist states 
and communities in constructing hospitals and public health centers.  By 2000 the Hill-Burton 
Act had dispensed more than $4.6 billion in grants as well as $1.5 billion in loans to nearly 6,800 
healthcare facilities in over 4,000 communities (Hill and Hill, 2004).   To be eligible for Hill-
Burton funds, the hospital  could  be  either  a public or not for profit entity.  Facilities were 
initially obliged to make a “reasonable volume” of free services available to persons unable to 
pay for a period of 20 years.  In 1979, “reasonable volume” was defined to be “not less than the 
lesser of (i) Three percent of its operating costs for the most recent fiscal year for which an 
audited financial statement is available; or (ii) Ten percent of all Federal assistance provided to 
or on behalf of the facility, adjusted by a percentage equal to the percentage change in the 
national Consumer Price Index for medical care between the year in which the facility received 
assistance or 1979, whichever is later, and the most recent year for which a published index is 
available.”
2
The obligation begins when construction of any facility built with Hill-Burton funds is 
completed.  If a facility does not provide the required volume of uncompensated care in any year, 
then it must make up the difference even if that takes more than 20 years.  Over the period under 
 
                                                 
2 42 C.F.R. $124.503 (1979)   6 
consideration, many hospitals converted from non-profit to for-profit status.  Nervetheless, these 
hospitals continued to be obligated by their Hill-Burton requirements
3
Although some public hospitals also received funding under Hill-Burton, we focus on the 
responses of private hospitals.  Previous studies have suggested little difference in the behavior 
of non-profit and for-profit private hospitals (Duggan, 2000; Needleman et al., 1999; Norton and 
Staiger, 1994; Pauly, 1987); both are constrained by market forces.  On the other hand, public 
hospitals are paid for by the state, city or county, and have an obligation to serve the indigent.  If 
they have a bad year financially, it is likely that their subsidy will be increased, whereas if they 
have a good year, their subsidy may be decreased.  Thus, we expect public hospitals to be much 
less aggressive in managing their caseloads than private hospitals.  In fact, we show below that 
public hospitals passively adjusted to a reduction in maternity care on the part of private 
hospitals whose Hill-Burton obligations had expired by increasing their own provision of 
maternity care. 
.  
  We can think of private hospitals (hereafter “hospitals”) as having a target level of charity 
care.  Frank and Salkever (1991) and Frank, Salkever, and Mitchell (1990) point out that this 
level can be greater than zero, if for example, providing charity care improves relationships with 
regulatory agencies, or increases donations to the hospital.  These hospital goals may be better 
served by spreading the same Hill-Burton expenditure over more patients, either because 
variance in expenditures is reduced or because more patients benefit.  If this is the case, then 
Hill-Burton hospitals will have an incentive to select the lowest expected cost patients for charity 
                                                 
3 The Hill-Burton regulations’ provision in such cases is that either the hospital continued to comply with the initial 
obligations stipulated by the contact signed with the non-profit entity or the federal loan is returned in full to the 
federal government. The same rule applied to hospital mergers in which one of the entities is under obligation at the 
time of the merger. The HRSA assured us that there were no cases in Florida in which the for-profit (or merged) 
hospital opted to return the grant money rather than take on the obligations. The updated list of Hill-Burton facilities 
and expiration dates was cross-checked with the list of hospital mergers and hospitals that changed to for-profit 
status to confirm this statement. No discrepancies were found.   7 
care.   If the optimal level of charity care is greater than the Hill-Burton requirement, then the 
obligation’s expiration should have no effect.  Alternatively, if it is binding then hospitals will 
reduce charity care when the obligations expire.   
It is clear that the obligations were binding.  Data on hospitals’ financial performance for 
the period 1979-2003 were obtained from the Agency for Health Care and Administration for the 
state of Florida. These data include the amounts spent by hospitals every year to meet their Hill 
Burton requirements and other funds donated or devoted to charity.  Figure 1 shows the fraction 
of total patient revenue devoted to Hill-Burton care by participating hospitals before and after 
their obligations expired.
4  The figure shows that hospitals spent close to the expected level of 3 
percent of operating costs on Hill-Burton patients in each fiscal year.  Since the operating costs 
generally increase from year to year, it is reasonable to expect that in current-year terms the 
fraction of costs devoted to Hill-Burton care would be slightly lower than three percent.
5
  One way to change the fraction of charity care patients is to change the mix of services 
provided. In his analysis of California’s Disproportionate Share (DSH) Program, Duggan (2000) 
shows that private hospitals that wished to increase their share of indigent patients in order to 
qualify for payments under the DSH program greatly expanded the number of maternity patients 
they served.  Hospitals preferred maternity patients for two reasons.  First, they are generally 
young healthy women with short expected stays, low expected costs, and a low variance of costs 
   
                                                 
4Hospitals that have not finished all of their obligations by the year of the expiration are expected to continue 
providing Hill-Burton care until those full obligations are met, which accounts for non-zero contributions in the 
years immediately following expiration. That explains the residual amounts contributed to Hill-Burton charity cases 
for the first couple of years after the expiration.  See 42 C.F.R § 124.503   Compliance levels:  (b) Deficits. If in any 
fiscal year a facility fails to meet its annual compliance level, it shall provide uncompensated services in an amount 
sufficient to make up that deficit in subsequent years, and its period of obligation shall be extended until the deficit 
is made up.   
5 A close examination of other sources of charity care in hospitals’ financial reports showed no discernible change 
associated with the expiration of Hill-Burton obligations. There is no evidence that hospitals re-directed 
uncompensated care cases through other charity programs to offset the lack of Hill-Burton designated funds.    8 
relative to (for example) elderly diabetics or heart patients. Second, expanded Medicaid coverage 
of pregnant women made them more lucrative than other categories of indigent patients. In 
Florida, the fraction of deliveries paid for my Medicaid rose from 25% to 36% between 1988 and 
1991 when the income threshold for Medicaid was raised from 100% to 150% of poverty 
(Marquis and Long, 1999).    
A simple calculation illustrates that by expanding maternity care, a hospital could meet 
its Hill-Burton requirements without bearing much risk of having to provide any additional 
uncompensated care above the requirement.  On average, hospitals in our sample devoted about 
$ 221,100 (2008 US dollars) per year to Hill-Burton charity care.
6  In 2008, the average inpatient 
charge for a delivery in Florida hospitals was approximately $2500, ranging from an average low 
charge of $1670 to an average high charge of $3340.
7 The average number of deliveries in 
hospitals under Hill-Burton obligation in our sample is 760.   If all Hill-Burton funds were used 
for maternity care, between 9% (using the average high charge) and 17% (using the average low 
charge) of deliveries would be accounted by the Hill-Burton program while the deliveries of 
most other low income mothers would be compensated by Medicaid.
8
                                                 
6 Authors’ calculations based on hospital financial reports. 
  A hospital might even be 
strategic about which cases it classified under Hill-Burton, placing women who did not qualify 
for Medicaid, or patients who did not cooperate with hospital efforts to help them to become 
covered, under Hill-Burton.   
7 The Florida Agency for Health Care Administration reports low and high charge averages for each hospital in the 
year. The “low” value is represented by the 25th percentile and the “high” value is represented by the 75th percentile 
of charges.  50 percent of the charges billed are between the 25th and 75th percentile. All charges data come from 
the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration Report, and are available at http://www.floridahealthfinder.gov 
8 Even deliveries to undocumented women were covered by Medicaid.   9 
In keeping with Duggan’s results and this illustration, Figure 2 shows that private 
hospitals in Florida that were initially covered by Hill-Burton were much less likely to offer 
maternity services after their Hill-Burton obligation expired. 
Finally, it may be difficult for hospitals to offer a different menu of services to different 
groups of women.   Suppose, for example, that a hospital may choose to offer aggressive or 
conservative maternity services.  Aggressive hospitals will routinely conduct additional tests and 
will perform C-sections in marginal cases.  Conservative hospitals will conduct fewer tests and 
will be less likely to perform C-sections in marginal cases.  There is a good deal of evidence that 
doctors and hospitals are responsive to financial incentives, and are more likely to perform C-
sections when C-sections are more highly compensated relative to normal deliveries (Currie, 
Gruber and Fischer 1995, Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 1998, Currie and MacLeod, 2008).  Further, 
it is thought that the marginal C-section in the U.S. is unnecessary: A Healthy People 2010 goal 
is to reduce the rate of C-sections from over 30 percent to 15 percent.  Baicker, Buckles and 
Chandra (2005) find that the marginal C-section is performed on a medically less appropriate 
patient and that only 25 percent of the geographical variation in C-section rates can be explained 
by differences in risk factors.   
To capture the idea that hospitals choose to offer either aggressive or conservative 
maternity services in order to maximize profits, suppose that it is profitable for a hospital serving 
privately insured women to offer aggressive services to maternity patients: 
(1) M(pa – ca) > M(pc – cc), 
where M is the number of privately insured maternity patients, pa  is the market price of 
aggressive services, ca is the cost of providing aggressive services, pc is the market price of a   10 
conservative bundle of maternity services and  cc is the cost of providing conservative maternity 
services.  Moreover, pa  >  pc  and ca > cc.    
If it is necessary to offer the same menu of services to all patients, then as the number of 
Hill-Burton (HB) patients rises, it may become profitable for the hospital to switch to the 
conservative bundle of services.  This will be the case if: 
(2) M(pc – cc) - HB cc > M(pa – ca) - HB ca. 
The cross-over occurs when (HB/M)(ca -cc) = (pa – ca) - (pc – cc); That is, when the share of Hill-
Burton patients, (HB/M) exceeds [(pa – pc) – (ca -cc)]/ (ca -cc).  This situation is illustrated in 
Figure 3.   
   The situation is slightly complicated by the presence of Medicaid patients.  In Florida, 
Medicaid reimburses at the same rate for C-sections and for vaginal deliveries.  We can capture 
the role of Medicaid patients by assuming that hospitals are always paid pc for Medicaid patients 
whether they provide conservative or aggressive care.  In this case, whenever condition (2) holds 
hospitals will still prefer to offer conservative care even with Medicaid patients since  (pc – cc) > 
(pc – ca). 
This simple model assumes that faced with two women with the same indications, 
different hospitals can make different choices about the bundle of services to be offered and that 
the marginal woman does not choose the hospital on the basis of the aggressiveness of the care, 
other things being equal.   
Figures 4 and 5 examine the use of primary C-section, and the admission of high risk 
maternity cases in hospitals that ever had Hill-Burton obligations, before and after the expiration 
of those obligations.  The figures show an increase in the admission of high risk patients, and an 
increase in the use of C-sections after expiration, as the model would predict.   11 
In summary, we expect that Hill-Burton obligations will be associated with a higher 
probability that a hospital has a maternity ward and with fewer aggressive procedures for 
maternity patients.  The expiration of Hill-Burton requirements are therefore likely to be 
accompanied by a rapid shifting of indigent patients from private to public hospitals and with the 
closure of maternity care units.  Whether this results in individuals receiving more aggressive 
services or not depends on whether the public hospitals that absorb the indigent patients are more 
likely to be conservative or aggressive compared to the private hospitals.  And whether changes 
in procedures affect health will depend on whether the marginal procedures are necessary or not:  
Increases in the use of necessary procedures will improve infant health outcomes, while 
increases in the use of unnecessary procedures are likely to have little effect on infant health. 
   
III. Data  
Data for this study were drawn from the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) 
hospital files, the Florida vital statistics and the federal Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) Hill Burton registry files. The AHA files contain data on the total 
number of admissions in the hospital, hospital ownership status, the number of Medicaid patients 
and whether the hospital offers maternity services. Many hospitals change names over time, but 
the AHA files conveniently maintain a unique hospital identifier that allows tracking the same 
hospital across different names.  
HRSA provided us with the latest list of Hill-Burton expiration dates for hospitals in 
Florida. It is important to work with the most updated information on hospital obligations since 
the periods may be extended if a facility is found to have been out of compliance in some years. 
Obligations only start once the hospital has initiated the project for which the funds were   12 
provided initially. The funds intended to reach the hospitals were slow to arrive from D.C. and 
even slower to process through the local authorities. The hospitals then had to start their own 
construction and expansion plans, which created further delays. We found that a number of 
hospitals that should have finished their 20-year obligation periods based on the year in which 
the contract was signed were still under obligation a few years later.  
Hospitals are coded as being under Hill-Burton obligation if the year when the birth 
occurred is before or the same as the calendar year in which the obligation expired. Hence the 
last births that are considered to have occurred in a hospital under obligation are in the last 
calendar year of the Hill-Burton contract. Table 1 shows the number of expirations of Hill-
Burton obligations and the number of births in hospitals covered by Hill-Burton obligations from 
1989 to 2003.   Over our sample period the fraction of births in hospitals covered by Hill-Burton 
obligations declined from almost 18 to just over 2 percent of all births, due to these expirations. 
The Florida Vital Statistics record all live births between 1989 and 2003. Confidential 
data including mothers’ names and birth dates were used to construct a panel data set linking 
births to the same mother over time.  The Natality data are very rich, and include information 
about the mother’s age, education, race and ethnicity; the child’s gender, birth order, and birth 
spacing; whether it was a multiple birth; prenatal care; risk factors for the pregnancy; 
complications of labor and delivery; and procedures used at the time of the birth in addition to 
information about infant outcomes including gestational age and APGAR scores.  Natality data 
has been matched to data on infant mortality so that we can also identify infants who die before 
age one.  We restrict the sample to singleton births and in most of our analyses, we focus on 
mothers with at least two births in the sample.   13 
The Vital Statistics Natality data contain the name and the county of the hospital in which 
the birth took place. We use these fields to match the natality data with the AHA hospital level 
data and the HRSA data about Hill-Burton expiration dates.
9
Table 2 provides an overview of our data.    The first two columns show a comparison of 
means for the full sample of all singleton births in our sample, and means for births to mothers 
who have two or more singleton births in the sample.  It is the latter group that we will focus on 
in the remainder of the paper.   Children born to mothers with more than one birth in the sample 
are likely to have had better birth outcomes, and are somewhat less likely to have had a C-section 
(15.3% vs. 12.0%).  Women with more than one birth are slightly younger, but more educated.  
They are more likely to deliver in hospitals with Hill-Burton obligations. 
   
Columns 3 through 5 show means for private hospitals and then for two subsets of private 
hospitals:  Those that ever had Hill-Burton obligations, and those that had Hill-Burton 
obligations at the time of the birth.  Means are shown only for mothers with more than 1 birth in 
the sample.  Mothers giving birth in hospitals under obligation are less likely to be black and 
Hispanic and more likely to have less than a high school education than other mothers giving 
birth in private hospitals.  They are also a little younger on average and less likely to have 
received adequate prenatal care.   
However, they are also less likely to be high risk.  We consider a pregnancy to be high 
risk if one of the following 15 conditions was indicated as a pregnancy risk factor on the birth 
certificate: maternal anemia, cardiac conditions, lung disease, diabetes, genital herpes, 
hydramnios (too much amniotic fluid), haemorraging, hypercalemia (elevated potassium levels 
                                                 
9 As a check on the consistency of the merge, the number of births in each facility was cross-checked between the 
Florida Vital Statistics and the AHA records. Every hospital listed in the Vital Statistics files was found in the AHA 
files. When there were two hospitals with the same names we used the number of births and the city of birth to 
establish the identity of the hospital. Data from the naval hospitals system in Florida were dropped because the Vital 
statistics data did not contain enough information on the facility to determine which naval hospital hosted the birth.   14 
in the blood), eclampsia (elevated blood pressure during or before labor), incompetent cervix, 
previous infant over 4000 grams, renal failure, previous preterm pregnancies, uterine infections, 
and other maternal risks not classified above.   
Mothers in hospitals under obligation have similar rates of complications of labor and 
delivery to other mothers in private hospitals.  We consider the following conditions to be 
complications of labor and delivery: premature rupture of membranes, abruptio placenta 
(separation of the normally located placenta after the 20th week of gestation and prior to birth), 
placenta previa (placenta is lying unusually low in the uterus), precipitous labor, breech (when 
the baby is not head down), fetal distress, excessive bleeding, prolonged labor, meconium (the 
baby inhales a mixture of amniotic fluid and fetal excretion), seizures during labor, dysfunctional 
labor, febrile labor, cephalopelvic disproportion (when a baby’s head or body is too large to fit 
through the mother’s pelvis), complications related to anesthesia, other complications not 
mentioned above.  
If the mothers giving birth in hospitals under Hill-Burton obligation are relatively low 
risk, then perhaps it is unsurprising that their outcomes in terms of low birth weight and low 
APGAR scores are similar to those in other private hospitals (although there is a slightly elevated 
risk of infant mortality).  A comparison of the last two columns suggests that once the Hill-
Burton obligation expired, hospitals were more willing to accept high risk patients who were 
more likely to give birth to premature and/or low birth weight babies with low APGAR scores.
10
 
   
 
 
                                                 
10 An infant is considered to be of low birth weight if the weight at birth is lower than 2500 grams.  A birth is 
considered premature if the gestation period was less than 37 weeks.  An APGAR score or less than 9 is considered 
low.   15 
IV. Methods 
We first examine responses to Hill-Burton expiration at the hospital level, and then 
examine the consequences for individual-level outcomes.  Hospital-level data is formed by 
aggregating the individual birth records to the hospital level and merging it with information 
about the hospital.  The hospital-level regressions take the following form:   
(1) HospCharht = α + β*OBLIGATIONht + ηt + μh + εht,  
where HospCharht is a hospital characteristic such as whether it offers maternity care, or the 
fraction of minority maternity patients that it serves, OBLIGATION is an indicator equal to one 
if the hospital is under Hill-Burton obligation to provide uncompensated care and 0 otherwise, ηt 
is a vector of year indicators and μh is a vector of hospital indicators and εht is a hospital-year 
specific error term.   Year indicators control for unrestricted year-to-year variation in average 
hospital characteristics.  The inclusion of hospital fixed effects allows us to compare the same 
hospitals before and after the expiration of Hill-Burton obligations. 
In order to examine individual-level outcomes we first estimate maternal fixed effects  
models of the following form:   
(2) Outcomeit = αi + β*OBLIGATIONit + Xit + ηt + εit,  
where Outcomeit is an individual-level outcome such as whether the baby was premature, or 
whether there was an infant death, OBLIGATION and ηt are defined as above, αi is a vector of  
indicators for each mother and εit is an individual and year specific error term.  The vector Xit  





th or higher order birth); and indicators for birth interval.  
  The inclusion of maternal fixed effects (the αi) allows us to control for constant 
unobserved characteristics of mothers that might affect both their choice of hospital and birth   16 
outcomes.   For example, a woman might have a health condition that made all of her 
pregnancies high risk.  However, it is possible that a woman will have risk factors for one 
pregnancy and not another.   Our hospital-level investigations will show that Hill-Burton 
hospitals are less likely to admit high-risk mothers.  If hospitals can observe information about 
whether a particular pregnancy is likely to be high risk, then a woman with one high risk and one 
low risk pregnancy may be less likely to deliver the high risk baby in a Hill-Burton hospital.  
Such a pattern would tend to bias the estimated effects of Hill-Burton obligations towards 
finding positive effects on infant health outcomes.   Moreover, fixed effects models can produce 
coefficients that are biased towards zero in the presence of measurement error, and there is likely 
to be measurement error in gestational age. 
  In order to take account of these potential issues, our preferred estimates are based on 
instrumental variables models with maternal fixed effects.  These models are of the form: 
(3) Outcomeit = αi + β*P(OBLIGATIONit) + Xit + ηt + εit,  
where P(OBLIGATIONit) is the predicted probability that the baby was born in a hospital under 
obligation from a first stage regression of the form: 
(4) P(OBLIGATIONit) = αi + β*FRAC_HBit + Xit + ηt + εit,  
where  FRAC_HBit is the fraction of births that are in Hill-Burton obligated hospitals at time t in 
the county in which we first observed the mother giving birth.    
The idea behind this instrument is that while the mother’s current county is endogenous, 
the county in which we first observe her is controlled for by the inclusion of the mother fixed 
effects.  The fraction of births in Hill-Burton obligated hospitals in this county will vary over 
time primarily because of Hill-Burton expirations, which are exogenous to the characteristics of 
any particular mother.   Hence, FRAC_HBit  should satisfy the criterion for a valid instrument in   17 
that it should be predictive of P(OBLIGATIONit) without having any direct effect on birth 
outcomes other than through its effects on the probability that a particular birth takes place in a 
hospital under obligation. 
For ease of computation, we have estimated (3) using a two step method in which we first 
calculate P(OBLIGATIONit), and then insert it in the regression.  Standard errors are calculated 
using the bootstrap and are clustered at the hospital level in order to take account of potential 
correlation in the unobservables within the same hospital. 
 
V. Results 
  Estimates of the effects of Hill-Burton obligations on hospital behavior from models with 
hospital fixed effects (equation (1)) are shown in Table 3.
11   The first column shows estimates 
from a model estimated over all hospital-years, examining the probability that a private hospital 
offers maternity care.  Consistent with Duggan (2000), hospitals that were constrained to offer 
charity care were more likely to have a maternity ward than other hospitals.  The next two 
columns provide some evidence about the types of services offered to patients for all hospitals 
that had 100 or more deliveries in a year.  Conditional on accepting maternity patients, Hill-
Burton hospitals were less likely to perform primary C-sections, and much less likely to report 
that mothers had any complications.   We focus on primary C-sections because doctors have less 
discretion about whether to perform a repeat C-section.
12
                                                 
11  For reference, ordinary least squares models of health outcomes without fixed effects are show in Appendix 
Table 1.  They show a similar pattern with reductions in prematurity, but no change in infant deaths, low birth 
weight, or low apgar scores.  
 
12  It is possible to have a vaginal birth after C-section (VBAC).  However, an anesthetist must stand by in case the 
VBAC fails and an emergency C-section becomes necessary.  Many hospitals are unable or unwilling to offer this 
service.  Moreover, given the risk attendant on VBAC, it is not sure whether a secondary C-section or a VBAC is 
the more “aggressive” procedure in terms of our model.  In our data, we observe 107,218 mothers who had a 
primary C-section and went on to have a second birth in our sample.  Of these, 82% had another C-section.  
Alternatively, since the method of delivery after a primary C-section can only be listed as a secondary C-section or a   18 
A natural question to ask is whether these differences in procedures reflect differences in 
the mothers admitted to the hospitals.  As Table 2 suggested, it appears that hospitals under 
obligation were much less likely to admit patients with known risk factors for the pregnancy.  
We do not find evidence however, that hospitals screened patients on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
or education.  Hence, it appears that Hill-Burton hospitals were selecting patients primarily on 
the basis of medical risk rather than demographics.  Consistent then with the model outlined 
above, hospitals subject to Hill-Burton requirements welcomed maternity patients, but only 
relatively healthy ones. 
These findings about patient selection suggest that we need to look to individual-level 
data in order to understand the implications of Hill-Burton for changes in the treatment of an 
individual mother.  Table 4 examines the sub-sample of mothers who had at least one delivery in 
a Hill-Burton hospital and looks at what happens to their choice of provider if the Hill-Burton 
requirement expires before a subsequent birth.  The models include mother fixed effects.  Table 
4 shows that these women are very likely to have had to change hospitals, and that a considerable 
fraction of them switched to public hospitals.  These results show clearly that the expiration of 
Hill-Burton obligations compelled many women who had delivered in private hospitals to switch 
to the public sector for their deliveries. 
Table 5 shows some initial results for individual-level outcomes.   The odd numbered 
columns show mother fixed effects estimates, while the even numbered columns show mother 
fixed effects-instrumental variables estimates.  The estimated first stage showed that the fraction 
of births in Hill-Burton obligated hospitals in the mother’s first observed county of residence is 
strongly predictive of her current birth being covered by Hill-Burton.  The coefficient of .984 
                                                                                                                                                             
VBAC, we can calculate Secondary/(Secondary+VBAC).  This rate is 80.5% confirming that most mothers who 
have a primary C-section have subsequent deliveries by C-section.   19 
(standard error .002) in the first stage implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction 
of births covered would increase the probability of the index birth being in a covered hospital by 
about 10%. 
The first panel of Table 5 suggests that giving birth in a Hill-Burton obligated hospital 
had no effect on most birth outcomes:  There is no significant effect on the incidence of low birth 
weight or the probability of infant death.  The probability of an APGAR score less than 9 falls 
with Hill-Burton in the fixed effects, but the standard errors increase in the fixed effects-IV 
model to the extent that the estimate is no longer statistically significant.   Surprisingly, given the 
other results, there does appear to be a substantial negative effect on the probability of 
prematurity.  Moreover, the estimated coefficient is larger in absolute value in the fixed effects-
IV model, which is consistent with our conjecture about the direction of potential bias in the 
mother fixed effects models.  (Appendix Table 1 shows that the same result obtains in OLS 
regressions – Hill Burton seems to be associated with a decrease in prematurity).    
The second panel probes the prematurity result by asking whether prematurity is reduced 
in each of several categories: Less than 32 weeks; between 32 weeks and 35 weeks, or between 
35 and 37 weeks.  It appears that the reduction occurs only between 35 and 37 weeks.  The last 
two columns also show that the reduction in prematurity is entirely among infants who are not 
low birth weight. 
This pattern suggests that the reduction in prematurity at Hill-Burton hospitals that occurs 
without improvement in any other infant health outcome could be reflective of a reduction in C-
sections.  Scheduled C-sections are normally performed slightly before full term to avoid the 
possibility that a woman will go into labor before the C-section can be performed.    20 
Table 6 confirms that children born in a hospital subject to Hill-Burton obligations are 
less likely to be delivered via primary C-section.  Table 6 also shows that there is no effect of 
Hill-Burton obligations on the prevalence of complications or risk factors once the characteristics 
of mothers are adequately controlled.  That is, Table 3 showed that hospitals subject to Hill-
Burton were more likely to admit uncomplicated, low-risk cases.  Table 5 controls for this type 
of selection using our fixed effects-IV specification.  The results in Table 6 suggest that as 
Baicker, Buckles and Chandra (2005) argue, the marginal C-section that is foregone in the Hill-
Burton hospital would have been conducted on a medically inappropriate patient—i.e. one who 
had no complications or risk factors!  
 
VI. Extensions 
We have estimated separate models for African-Americans and Hispanics.  These groups may be 
of particular interest since African-Americans tend to have worse average birth outcomes other 
things being equal, while Hispanics tend to have better outcomes, other things being equal but 
are more likely to be undocumented.  Since undocumented immigrants are not eligible for 
Medicaid coverage of their pregnancies in Florida (though labor and delivery is covered), access 
to charity care under Hill-Burton may have been particularly important for Hispanic mothers.   
Appendix Tables 2 through 4 indicate that the effects for African-Americans are quite 
similar qualitatively to those we have discussed above.  Hill-Burton is associated with a 
reduction in prematurity which is concentrated among infants who were between 35 and 37 
weeks gestation, and which may be accounted for by a decrease in C-section rates when hospitals 
are under Hill-Burton obligation.   21 
The effects for Hispanics are less clear.  There is a much larger decrease in prematurity, 
(coefficient of -.042 compared to -.017  for the full sample).  The  reduction is statistically 
significant only for infants between 32 and 35 weeks gestation, although the point estimate is 
much larger for the reduction in prematurity between 35 and 37 weeks (-.017 for 32-35 vs. -.033 
for 35-37).  However, in contrast to the results for blacks and non-Hispanic whites, there is no 
change  in primary C-section rates associated with Hill-Burton for Hispanics.  A possible 
explanation is that  hospitals have little incentive to perform C-sections on mothers without 
insurance with or without Hill-Burton.   
 
VII. Conclusions 
  If health care reform is successful, then in future there will be many fewer uninsured 
patients.  However, given rising health care costs, it is likely that a considerable number of 
people will remain underinsured and it is of interest to consider how their medical needs can best 
be served.  The results in this paper suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that it can be better to require 
private providers to serve the underinsured, rather than serving them in separate public facilities.  
Private providers confronted with charity patients have an incentive to provide care in the most 
efficient way possible.  Moreover, changes in procedures that are adopted in order to cope with 
charity patients may spillover to fully-insured patients, resulting in further efficiencies.   It is 
striking to see how quickly private hospitals responded to changes in their incentives upon the 
expiration of Hill-Burton requirements.   
On the other hand, public facilities have little incentive to provide care in the lowest cost 
manner.  Still, it is clear that private providers steer clear of the highest risk charity patients, so   22 
that a public safety net may remain necessary even when private providers handle many of the 
lower risk charity cases. 
  An important caveat is that we focus on one condition and one procedure (C-section).  
While child birth is a common and important cause of hospitalization, it will be important to 
determine whether the same pattern is observed for others conditions and procedures. 
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Note: The figure is constructed based on ratios of Hill Burton expenses to lagged total patient 
expense from hospitals’ financial data.  Data on hospitals’ financial statements come from the 
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.  Data on two hospitals that had Hill-Burton 
obligations were excluded from the sample because recorded rates of Hill-Burton expenditures in 
the 4
th year after expiration of the obligations were 33% and 66% respectively.  HRSA overseers 
confirmed that these were data entry errors.  27 
Figure 2: Presence of maternity ward as a function of Hill Burton obligations status 
 
 
Note: The figure is based on mean residuals relative to the time that Hill Burton obligations 
expired. The residuals were obtained from a linear probability regression of the outcome variable 
(0 if there are no births in the hospital-year observation, 1 if there are births) on hospital and year 
fixed effects. The sample of hospitals included in the regression is restricted to 1495 private 
hospitals and the time period is 1989-2003.  Only residuals for hospitals that experienced a Hill-
Burton expiration are included.  Data on hospital operations come from the Florida Vital 
statistics and the American Hospital Association Hospital Survey.    28 
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Figure 4: Primary C-Section Rates and Hill Burton Expiration 
 
Note: Plots based on yearly averages of residuals from hospital-level regression of 
outcome on hospital and year fixed effects.  Residuals are averaged across hospitals for 
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Note: Plots based on yearly averages of residuals from hospital-level regression of 
outcome on hospital and year fixed effects.  Residuals are averaged across hospitals for 
every year of Hill-Burton obligation; balanced sample for -3 to +4 years after HB 
expiration.   31 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Births in Hill-Burton Hospitals and Hill-Burton Obligation Expirations by Year  
 
Year  Percent births in HB 
hospitals 
N HB births  N hospitals with obligations 
expiring during the year 
1989  17.72  14,529   6 
1990  14.83  13,922   1 
1991  11.67  11,169  2 
1992  10.71  10,493  1 
1993  8.7  8,840  5 
1994  4.98  5,018  2 
1995  3.59  3,623  1 
1996  2.96  3,002  2 
1997  2.8  2,919  1 
1998  2.71  2,862  - 
1999  2.74  2,822  - 
2000  2.64  2,690  1 
2001  1.98  1,894  - 
2002  2.04  1,767  - 
2003  1.94  1,497  1 
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Birth to Mothers 








Hill Burton births 
(moms>2 
children) 
  N= 2321729  N=1447624  N=1084734  N=276419  N=87060 
          Outcomes     
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
Infant death  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.011  0.011 
Low birth weight  0.069  0.064  0.059  0.067  0.067 
Apgar score <=8  0.025  0.023  0.020  0.023  0.023 
prenatal care in 1st trimester  0.704  0.778  0.804  0.754  0.754 
High risk pregnancy  0.235  0.233  0.240  0.269  0.269 
Complications of labor  0.299  0.284  0.278  0.260  0.260 
Premature child   0.087  0.084  0.077  0.084  0.084 
B/n 35 and 37 weeks  0.051  0.050  0.048  0.049  0.042 
B/n 32 and 35 weeks  0.019  0.018  0.016  0.015  0.015 
Less than 32 weeks  0.015  0.015  0.013  0.016  0.012 
Primary cesarean  0.152  0.120  0.122  0.121  0.129 
Premature but not LBW  0.040  0.041  0.038  0.038  0.032 
       
 Control 
Variables   
 
  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean   
Hill-Burton birth  0.056  0.060  0.080  0.315  1.00 
Ratio HB in first county of 
residence  0.061  0.060  0.067  0.138  0.362 
  [0.140]  [0.138]  [0.150]  [0.228]  [0.275] 
Maternal age  26.932  26.550  26.911  26.439  25.936 
  [6.292]  [5.933]  [5.849]  [5.957]  [5.711] 
Interval previous birth  37.278  37.585  37.848  37.398  35.770 
  [12.264]  [16.194]  [16.471]  [15.885]  [11.050] 
Black mother  0.216  0.242  0.227  0.250  0.208 
Hispanic mother  0.172  0.178  0.180  0.128  0.140 
< high school education  0.192  0.156  0.138  0.173  0.174 
Total fertility  2.125  2.623  2.754  2.824              2.896 
  [1.18]  [1.127]  [1.133]  [1.182]  [1.205] 
Private hospital  0.739  0.748  1.000  1.000  1.000   33 
Table 3: Hospital services by Hill-Burton status, Hospital Fixed Effects Regressions 
    Panel A: Hospital services   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Under HB obligation  0.145***  -0.018**  -0.066**  -0.076** 
  (0.049)  (0.007)  (0.028)  (0.031) 
Constant  0.776***  0.197***  0.382***  0.290*** 
  (0.040)  (0.007)  (0.024)  (0.029) 
Observations  1495  1272  1272  1272 
Mean of dep variable  0.914  0.156  0.303  0.261 
       
    Panel B: Patient Demographics   
  Ratio <high 
school 
Ratio Black  Ratio Hispanic   
Under HB obligation  0.007  0.024  -0.002   
  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.012)   
Constant  0.194***  0.131***  0.110***   
  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.010)   
Observations  1272  1272  1272   
Mean of dep. Variable  0.212  0.183  0.162   
 
Notes: All regressions include year effects as well as hospital fixed effects.  Hospitals are coded as 
under Hill-Burton obligations (Hill-Burton=1) if the year of delivery is prior to or equal to the year of expiration 
of hospital Hill-Burton obligations as reported by HRSA. The unit of observation is a hospital-year cell. Some 
hospital-year cell are missing data on NICU availability. The model for maternity wards includes all hospital-
year cells. The remaining models only hospital-year cells containing at least 100 births.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  A * indicates significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level.  34 
Table 4: Fixed Effects Estimates of Hospital Selection Among Mothers who First Delivered in a Hill 








  FE  FE 
Birth is first post 
HB expiration 
0.332***  -0.088*** 
  (0.065)  (0.030) 
R-squared  0.501  0.666 
Mean of dep 
variable 
0.223  0.923 
 
Notes: There are 175,255 individual-level observations.  The sample is restricted to mothers who had at 
least one delivery in a Hill-Burton hospital. Post Hill-Burton expiration is coded as 1 if the birth happened 
after the expiration of Hill- Burton obligations in the first Hill-Burton hospital of delivery and 0 otherwise. In 
addition to siblings fixed effects, all regressions include controls for male sex of the child, calendar year 
fixed effects, total birth order dummies, and birth interval dummies. Standard errors are bootstrapped and 
clustered on the hospital level.  A * indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5%.  35 
Table 5: Fixed Effects and Fixed Effects-IV Estimates of the Effect of Delivery in a Hill-Burton Obligated 
Hospital and Infant Health 
 
  Infant death  LBW  Low Apgar Score  Premature 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Panel 1  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV 
















Mean of dep. 
variable 




Less than 32 
weeks 
>= 32 and <35 
weeks 
>=35 and <37 
weeks 
Premature but not 
LBW 
















Mean of dep. 
variable 
0.015  0.015  0.018  0.018    0.050 
 
0.050  0.041  0.041 
 
Notes: There are 1,446,624 individual-level observations.  The first stage for the fixed effects-IV regressions 
has a coefficient estimate of 0.984 (.002) on the instrument (FRAC_HBit ) which is the fraction of births that 
are in Hill-Burton obligated hospitals at time t in the county in which we first observe the mother giving birth.   
Hospitals are coded as under Hill Burton obligations (Hill Burton=1) if the year of delivery is prior to or equal 
to the year of expiration of hospital Hill Burton obligations as reported by HRSA. In FE-IV regressions the 
Hill Burton treatment dummy is instrumented with the ratio of Hill Burton births in the first county of maternal 
residence. In addition to siblings fixed effects, all regressions include controls for male sex of the child, 
calendar year fixed effects, total birth order dummies, and birth interval dummies. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped and clustered on the hospital level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   36 
Table 6: Fixed Effects and Fixed Effects-IV Estimates of Differences in Procedure Rates and 
Maternal Selection by Hill Burton Status 
 
All births    Primary C-
section 
Complications  High Risk mother  Prenatal care visit in 
the 1st trimester 
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
      FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  IV 
Hill-Burton  
Birth 
















Mean of dep. 
variable 
    0.120  0.120  0.284  0.284  0.233  0.233  0.778  0.778 
 
Notes: There are 1,447,624 individual-level observations.  The first stage for the fixed effects-IV 
regressions has a coefficient estimate of 0.984 (.002) on the instrument (FRAC_HBit ) which is the fraction of 
births that are in Hill-Burton obligated hospitals at time t in the county in which we first observe the mother 
giving birth.   Hospitals are coded as under Hill Burton obligations (Hill Burton=1) if the year of delivery is 
prior to or equal to the year of expiration of hospital Hill Burton obligations as reported by HRSA.  In addition 
to siblings fixed effects, all regressions include controls for male sex of the child, calendar year fixed effects, 
total birth order dummies, and birth interval dummies. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  A * 
indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the 
hospital level. 
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Appendix Tables: 
 
Table A1 Hill Burton and Individual Health Outcomes – OLS Regressions 
 




  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Hill Burton  -.000  -.005  -.003  -.013** 
  (.001)  (.004)  (.003)  (.005) 
# Observations      1447624     1447624     1447624      1447624 
 
Notes: Hospitals are coded as under Hill Burton obligations (Hill Burton=1) if the year of delivery is prior to or 
equal to the year of expiration of hospital Hill Burton obligations as reported by HRSA. All regressions 
include controls for male sex of the child, calendar year fixed effects, total birth order dummies, birth interval 
dummies, controls for black race and Hispanic ethnicity, a dummy indicating less than high school 
education, and total fertility dummies. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered on the hospital level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. A * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, *** significance at 
1%. 
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Table A2: Hill Burton and Individual Health Outcomes 
Hispanics only 
  Infant Death  LBW  Low Apgar score  Premature 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV 
Hill  Burton 0.002  -0.011  -0.003 -0.002  -0.002  -0.009 -0.011*  -0.042* 
  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006) (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.009) (0.006) (0.022) 
  
Less than 32 weeks 
 
>= 32 and <35 weeks 
 
>=35 and <37 weeks 
Premature but not 
LBW 
Hill  Burton    -0.002  -0.004  -0.002 -0.017**  -0.007  -0.033 -0.008 -0.033 
 (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.021)  (0.007)  (0.021) 
#  Obs.  258774  258774  258774 258774  258774  258774 258774 258774 
Blacks only 
  Infant Death  LBW  Low Apgar score  Premature 
Hill  Burton  -0.001 0.003  -0.011  -0.013 -0.004 -0.005  -0.020**  -0.029* 
  (0.002) (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.010) (0.004) (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
  
Less than 32 weeks 
 
>= 32 and <35 weeks 
 
>=35 and <37 weeks 
Premature but not 
LBW 
Hill  Burton    -0.005 -0.004  -0.005  -0.008 -0.011*  -0.016*  -0.010**  -0.013* 
  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
#  Obs.  380160 380160  380160  380160 380160 380160  380160  380160 
 
Notes: Hospitals are coded as under Hill Burton obligations (Hill Burton=1) if the year of delivery is prior to or equal to the year 
of expiration of hospital Hill Burton obligations as reported by HRSA. In FE-IV regressions the Hill Burton treatment dummy is 
instrumented with the ratio of Hill Burton births in the first county of maternal residence. In addition to siblings fixed effects, all 
regressions include controls for male sex of the child, calendar year fixed effects, total birth order dummies, and birth interval 
dummies. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered on the hospital level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  A * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A3: Differences in procedure rates by Hill Burton status 
  Primary C-section  Complications  High Risk mother  Prenat care visit 1st 
trimester 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Hispanics  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV  FE  FE-IV 
HB Child  0.023  0.012  0.051*  0.010  0.050*  -0.124  -0.060***  -0.029 
  (0.023)  (0.044)  (0.029)  (0.073)  (0.029)  (0.079)  (0.019)  (0.050) 
Obs  258774  258774  258774  258774  258774  258774  258774  258774 
 
Blacks                 
HB Child  -0.010  -0.024**  -0.024  0.009  -0.037  -0.077  -0.000  0.039* 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.035)  (0.048)  (0.041)  (0.081)  (0.015)  (0.022) 
Obs  380160  380160  380160  380160  380160  380160  380160  380160 
 
Notes: The first stage for the fixed effects-IV regressions has a coefficient estimate of 0.984 (.002) on the 
instrument (FRAC_HBit ) which is the fraction of births that are in Hill-Burton obligated hospitals at time t in 
the county in which we first observe the mother giving birth.   Hospitals are coded as under Hill Burton 
obligations (Hill Burton=1) if the year of delivery is prior to or equal to the year of expiration of hospital Hill 
Burton obligations as reported by HRSA.  In addition to siblings fixed effects, all regressions include controls 
for male sex of the child, calendar year fixed effects, total birth order dummies, and birth interval dummies. :  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  A * indicates significance at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  Standard 
errors are bootstrapped and clustered at the hospital level. 
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Table A4: Sibling Fixed Effects Models of Hospital selection 
  Change of hospital 
- Hispanics 





Delivery in private 
hospital - Blacks 
Post first HB 
expiration 
0.425***  -0.126***  0.305***  -0.106** 
  (0.063)  (0.047)  (0.091)  (0.048) 
Observations  22927  22927  43126  43126 
R-squared  0.485  0.596  0.519  0.663 
 
Notes: The sample is restricted to mothers who had at least one delivery in a Hill Burton 
hospital. Post Hill Burton expiration is coded as 1 if the birth happened after the 
expiration of Hill Burton obligations in the first Hill Burton hospital of delivery and 0 
otherwise. In addition to siblings fixed effects, all regressions include controls for male 
sex of the child, calendar year fixed effects, total birth order dummies, and birth interval 
dummies. Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered on the hospital level.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  A * indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.   